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CDSA TELEWARRANTS MAY BE 
EXECUTED AT ANY TIME  
R. v. Dueck, 2005 BCCA 448 
 
Police executed a telewarrant 
to search the accused’s 
residence using s.11(2) of the 
Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA).  The warrant was 
executed just before midnight and police found 
461 marihuana plants along with 20 pounds of 
harvested marihuana. The accused were 
convicted in British Columbia Supreme Court on 
charges of production, possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, and fraudulently 
diverting electricity.  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
warrant should not have been executed during 
the night. Although s.11(1) of the CDSA 
authorizes the execution of its warrants “at any 
time”, the accused submitted that the 
telewarrant procedures via s.11(2) of the CDSA 
are outlined under s.487.1 of the Criminal Code,  
which restrict the execution of warrants by day, 
unless night warrants are expressly authorized. 
In the accused’s view, the warrant in this case 
should have not been executed at night. 
 
Justice Ryan, for the unanimous British Columbia 
Court of Appeal, rejected this argument. She 
concluded there were two types of warrants 
that could be obtained under either the CDSA or 
the Criminal Code—warrants or telewarrants. In 
the case of CDSA warrants, they may be 
executed at any time. Criminal Code warrants, on 
the other hand, may be executed only by day 
unless specific authorization is granted.             
 
 
In interpreting the CDSA provisions that allow 
for the authorization of telewarrants, the 
provisions of s.488 of the Criminal Code 
prohibiting nighttime execution of telewarrants 
unless the justice is satisfied there are 
reasonable grounds included in the information 
to obtain that the warrant should be executed 
at night do not apply. In Justice Ryan’s opinion, 
there was “no sensible reason…that would 
require the provisions of a warrant obtained over 
the telephone or by fax under the CDSA to be 
different in substance from one obtained in 
person where the substantive requirements to 
obtain them are the same.” The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
On Police Duty—The well known saying from 
Gilbert & Sullivan that "A policeman's lot is not a 
happy one" is true -- at times, but it is also true 
with regard to all public officials. They must 
expect more or less so called abuse. It is an 
incident of democratic government and free 
speech; and they should bear it, if not in good 
humour, at least with reasonable tolerance and 
that fact which is a very necessary part of the 
equipment of a servant of the public. In this 
country a policeman is a peace officer, and his 
duty is not only to the public generally but to 
every individual citizen, and to protect that 
citizen, and to protect him, as far as possible, 
even against his own weakness, and not to hail 
him before the Magistrate for every foolish 
thing he does—Co. Crt. J. Roberts1 
                                                 
1 R. v. Zwicker, (1937) 69 CCC 301 (N.S.Co.Crt.) 
 
 2            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 5 
  September/October 2005 
 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
“Once again, you provide a 
great service to the LEO's 
of this country.”—Police 
Officer, British Columbia  
************ 
“Great newsletter and keep them coming!”—
Military Police Officer, Alberta 
************ 
“I would be grateful if you could place me on 
your news letter e-mail distribution list. I just 
recently found your website, and have passed it  
around to some of the guys in my department. As 
I also teach a police foundations course in a 
community college, I found your case law items 
of particular interest.”—Police Officer, Ontario 
************ 
“I just read an edition of 10-8.... I learned more 
from that newsletter than I have from any other 
recent publication.”—Police Constable, British 
Columbia 
************ 
“Could I get on the mailing list for future 
editions? I can print it off and share it with the 
troops here. Everybody loves to read it.”—Police 
Constable, RCMP British Columbia    
************ 
“I am a member of the Military Police… and I 
have had the opportunity to read a couple copies 
of the 10-8 Newsletter and find it to be a great 
source of information.  I would like to be placed 
on your email list so that I can be kept up to 
date on recent cases that may affect me.  Thank 
you.”—Military Police Officer, British Columbia  
************ 
“I receive the 10-8 newsletter by e-mail and it is 
an exceptional resource on many levels - 
thanks!”—Police Detective, British Columbia 
 
“I teach Law 12…and, after looking at one of the 
[newsletter] issues, I was quite impressed.  Your 
articles add some flesh to the bare bones of 
Law, and help my students.”—High School 
Teacher, British Columbia 
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All past editions of this 
newsletter are available online 
by clicking on the Police 
Academy link at:  
www.jibc.bc.ca 
 
ABSENCE OF GOOD FAITH 
MAY BE NEUTRAL IN 
ASSESSING ADMISIBILITY 
R. v. Smith, 2005 BCCA 334 
 
The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal recently reviewed the 
meaning of good faith in a case 
where a police officer applied 
for a telewarrant under the Criminal Code to 
search the accused’s home and computer for 
child pornography evidence. Under the s.24(2) 
Charter analysis to determine the admissibility 
of evidence, the good faith of a police officer is 
often a factor to consider in determining the 
seriousness of a Charter breach. In this 
decision, Justice Ryan provided a review of good 
faith and had this to say: 
 
As I understand the case-law that has 
followed, good faith on the part of the 
offending police officers mitigates the 
seriousness of the offence while a deliberate 
or flagrant disregard will enhance its 
seriousness.  It is a question of degree.  The 
cases have not equated a finding of no good 
faith with a finding of bad faith.  I would 
suggest that this is because of the way good 
faith has been defined. [para. 56] 
 
She further went on to note that the actions of 
the police must be knowingly or intentionally 
wrong to qualify as bad faith. She stated: 
 
To sum up, good faith connotes an honest and 
reasonably held belief.  If the belief is honest, 
but not reasonably held, it cannot be said to 
constitute good faith.  But it does not follow 
that it is therefore bad faith.  To constitute 
bad faith the actions must be knowingly or 
intentionally wrong. 
 
It is interesting to note that in Kokesch 
Sopinka J. concluded (at p. 231) that the 
Charter violation in that case was "very 
serious, and was in no sense mitigated by good 
faith".  In the passage above he characterized 
the actions of the police in Genest as 
enhancing the seriousness of the Charter 
violation.  I take from all of this that while 
good faith will mitigate, and bad faith will 
invariably increase the seriousness of the 
breach, the absence of good faith may be a 
neutral factor or an enhancing factor 
depending on the circumstances of the case.  
 
In the case at bar, the trial judge concluded 
that the information to obtain contained a 
misleading error because the officer who 
prepared it was sloppy.  He did not do it with 
the intention of deceiving the judicial justice 
of the peace.  It is somewhat unclear whether 
the trial judge was prepared to make the 
crucial finding that the mistake was 
unreasonable.  He seems to have treated the 
error as within the range of unfortunate but 
acceptable human error.  In any case even if it 
was something that the police officer ought to 
have noticed, the trial judge did not find that 
the error compounded the seriousness of the 
Charter breach. 
 
In my view the trial judge did not err in failing 
to find that the police officer acted in bad 
faith. [paras. 61-64] 
 
As for the admission of the evidence, Justice 
Ryan would not interfere with the trial judge’s 
decision. In her view, the police work in this case 
was poor but was not motivated by an ulterior 
motive or bad faith.  The accused’s appeal 
seeking exclusion was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
 
Don’t miss 
out!!!
www.policeleadership.org 
(see p. 20) 
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DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that men are three times more 
likely to report being dishonest 
with police officers than women. 
In a recent Leger Marketing 
Report entitled “The Honesty of 
Canadians,” only 3% of women 
said they would be more likely to 
be less honest with police 
officers compared to 9% of 
men2. 
 
CONFEDERATION BRIDGE OFF 
LIMITS TO PROVINCIAL 
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC ACT 
R. v. Noel, 2005 PESCAD 16 
 
The accused was stopped for 
speeding on the Confederation 
Bridge which joins Prince 
Edward Island to New 
Brunswick. He was issued a 
ticket under Prince Edward Island’s Highway 
Traffic Act and plead not guilty. At trial he was 
convicted and fined $36. His appeal was 
dismissed. He then again appealed, this time to 
the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal.  
 
Chief Justice Mitchell, writing the unanimous 
decision, granted the appeal and set aside the 
conviction. Only the Parliament of Canada can 
regulate traffic or create offences on the 
Confederation Bridge pursuant to the 
Government Property Traffic Act. Neither the 
legislature of Prince Edward Island nor New 
Brunswick has any authority related to creating 
driving related offences on the Bridge. As Chief 
Justice Mitchell noted, “A person who speeds on 
the Confederation Bridge no more commits an 
offence under the Prince Edward Island Highway 
Traffic Act than does someone who speeds in 
British Columbia.” 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
                                                 
2 Source: www.legermarketing.com (June 5, 2005) 
VALID TRAFFIC STOP 
JUSTIFIES DETENTION 
R. v. Yague, 2005 ABCA 140 
 
The accused was pulled over by 
uniformed traffic officers 
after other members 
conducting site surveillance on 
an unrelated matter requested his vehicle be 
stopped. One of the surveillance officers had 
recognized the accused as someone who was 
involved in the drug trade. The uniformed 
members following him saw the vehicle speed 
through a construction zone and noted the rear 
licence plate light was not working. The vehicle 
was stopped and the accused was arrested on an 
outstanding arrest warrant. The other occupants 
were identified, including passenger Lau who was 
also arrested. He was on a recognizance not to 
be in possession of cell phones or pagers and an 
officer could see a cell phone and pager within 
his reach. The vehicle was then searched and 
police found other drug trafficking paraphernalia 
including a kilogram of cocaine in a knapsack 
under the rear seat.  
 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
the accused was convicted of possession of 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The 
judge erroneously concluded that the police had 
the power to stop motor vehicles for the 
purpose of gathering intelligence and dismissed 
the accused’s application to exclude evidence. He 
then appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing that the detention and search violated 
the Charter. In his view, the police arbitrarily 
detained him under s.9 because they did not 
have reasonable grounds for stopping his vehicle. 
Furthermore, he submitted the search was 
unlawful, a s.8 violation, and the evidence should 
have been excluded under s.24(2).  
 
A unanimous three member Alberta Court of 
Appeal dismissed the accused’s appeal. Although 
the trial judge erred in his reasons, the 
admission of the evidence was the correct 
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result. In this case, the traffic officer 
witnessed traffic violations before stopping the 
accused’s vehicle. The police, therefore, had 
reasonable grounds and a proper basis on which 
to pull the vehicle over. The Court held: 
 
Even though the initial request to uniformed 
traffic officers to stop the vehicle was made 
when the police in the surveillance team did 
not realize that they had sufficient grounds to 
support a stop (the outstanding warrant), the 
stop which was made later was not arbitrary 
since there were reasonable grounds to believe 
that the [accused] had committed traffic 
violations. The uniformed traffic officer 
testified that whatever the surveillance team 
wanted, the uniformed officer was not going to 
stop this car unless he saw a traffic violation… 
 
Once the initial stop had been lawfully made, a 
further search on the suspicion of illegal drugs 
does not taint the stop [references omitted, 
paras. 7-8] 
 
The detention was not arbitrary and therefore, 
did not violate s. 9 of the Charter. As for the 
search, it was lawful as an incident to arrest. 
The police had reasonable grounds to arrest Lau 
for breaching his recognizance “Where the 
police have reasonable and probable grounds for 
arrest, a search, as incidental to an arrest, is 
legal and not in violation of s. 8 of the Charter,” 
said the Court. “A search is incidental to an 
arrest when there is some valid purpose for the 
search, such as, a reasonable prospect of 
securing evidence of the offence for which the 
accused is being arrested. It does not require 
reasonable and probable grounds, only some 
reasonable basis for the search”. Here, the 
police could search the vehicle incident to arrest 
in order to secure evidence of Lau’s breach of 
recognizance, which meant searching for other 
cell phones and pagers. In upholding the search, 
Alberta’s top court stated: 
 
The police seized the phone and pager 
observed near Lau. They then found another 
cell phone in the front of the vehicle and a box 
on the rear seat next to where Lau was sitting. 
The box contained, in addition to an empty cell 
phone box, drug trafficking paraphernalia. The 
contents of the box further substantiated the 
grounds which the police would already have 
had to search for drugs. Lau’s release 
condition, prohibiting possession of a cell 
phone, is common in a recognizance for drug 
charges as it is intended to assist in 
preventing the continued trafficking of illegal 
drugs by taking away one of the common tools 
of the trade. As well, the [accused] and Lau 
were known to be involved in the illegal drug 
trade. The circumstances suggested the three 
occupants of the vehicle were involved in 
trafficking cocaine. Thus, the search, which 
eventually found the knapsack under the back 
seat containing cocaine, and the seizure of the 
cocaine and drug trafficking paraphernalia 
were reasonable and therefore, no violation of 
s. 8 occurred. [para. 12] 
 
Finally, even if the accused’s rights had been 
violated, the evidence was admissible under 
s.24(2).  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
BY THE NUMBERS:  
FATAL MVAs 
 
Fatal MVAs—BC’s 2004 Top 10 
City/Town Number 
Surrey (RCMP) 26 
Vancouver 21 
Victoria 15 
Abbotsford 14 
Squamish (RCMP) 13 
Langley (RCMP) 12 
Hope (RCMP) 11 
Burnaby (RCMP) 10 
Coquitlam (RCMP) 10 
Prince George (RCMP) 10 
Source: BC Coroners Service, Motor Vehicle Accident Deaths-
1997 to 2004, August 23, 2005 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
For every mile of road there is two miles of 
ditch—Leon Fontaine  
 6            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 5 
  September/October 2005 
NO AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO 
SEARCH VEHICLE INCIDENT 
TO ARREST 
R. v. Bulmer, 2005 SKCA 90 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused’s vehicle after he 
noticed it did not have a front 
licence plate and had been 
weaving on the road. After producing a driver’s 
licence and vehicle registration, the officer 
queried the accused on CPIC and learned he had 
an outstanding traffic warrant for an unpaid fine 
of failing to wear a seatbelt. The accused said he 
thought he had paid the fine, but the warrant 
was confirmed to be valid and still in effect. He 
was arrested on the outstanding warrant and the 
officer saw a pocket knife clipped to the inside 
of his waistband. The knife was removed and the 
accused was patted down, advised of his rights, 
and placed in the backseat of the police car.  
 
The officer then searched the vehicle for 
further weapons and for evidence of the 
accused’s assertion that he paid the ticket, such 
as a receipt or copy of the seatbelt ticket. As 
the officer looked through the driver’s side 
window he saw a black cloth sheath for the 
pocket knife lying by the accelerator. He opened 
the door and could then smell a strong odour of 
raw marihuana. In the trunk the officer found 
2.4 kgs. of marihuana vacuum sealed in a 
backpack. The accused was then arrested for 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking. At his trial in Saskatchewan 
Provincial Court, the judge found the search 
valid as an incident to arrest and the accused 
was convicted.  
 
The accused then appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal. Justice Jackson, writing the 
unanimous appeal court judgment, first examined 
the law regarding searches incident to arrest. 
She noted that such searches of vehicles can 
only be undertaken if the police have a valid 
reason for the search, such as ensuring the 
safety of the police and public, protecting 
evidence from destruction, or to discover 
evidence. But in this case, Justice Jackson found 
the search could not be justified for safety. In 
dismissing the safety reason, Justice Jackson 
noted the following: 
 
• The accused was young (18 years old), had no 
prior record, was fully cooperative, and was 
locked in the back of the police car; 
 
• The jackknife had a 2 ½ inch blade and was 
not a prohibited weapon; and 
 
• Two other officers were present as back-up. 
 
As for looking for more evidence, it could not be 
said that further evidence was required with 
respect to the seatbelt ticket. Nor did seeing 
the pocket knife sheath give the officer a new 
reason to search. Only when he smelled the 
marihuana did the officer have new and 
reasonable grounds that marihuana was in the 
vehicle. Since the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his vehicle and the 
officer lacked a valid purpose in mind when 
searching the vehicle, the accused’s s.8 Charter 
right protecting him against unreasonable search 
and seizure was violated.  
 
As for the admission of the evidence, it was 
excluded under s.24(2) even though vehicles 
attract a reduced expectation of privacy. 
Although the evidence was non-conscriptive and 
necessary to prove the Crown’s case for a 
serious offence, there was no urgency and no 
reasonable grounds for the search once the 
accused was arrested and secured in the back of 
the police car.  
 
“[The accused] was not under arrest in 
furtherance of a suspected new crime [but] was 
arrested pursuant to a warrant for arrest,” said 
Justice Jackson.  “And the warrant for the 
arrest was for the failure to appear in relation 
to a summons to pay a seatbelt infraction.  If 
one contrasts the seriousness of the reason for 
which [the accused] was arrested with the 
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ultimate consequence of the unlawful search, the 
disproportion alone seems to dictate exclusion.” 
Moreover, the legal limits of a stop like this in 
relation to a minor traffic offence need to be 
clearly understood by police and the Court was 
not prepared to condone this unacceptable police 
conduct. To do so would further bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The 
evidence was excluded and an acquittal was 
entered. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
CHARTER DOES NOT APPLY TO 
PRIVATE INVESTIGATIVE 
DETENTIONS 
R. v. Dell, 2005 ABCA 246 
 
A bouncer entered the men’s 
washroom of a bar, looked into a 
cubicle through a crack, and saw 
the accused fiddling with a black 
film canister. Suspecting it was 
drugs, the bouncer detained the accused and 
alerted the manager who patted him down for 
weapons. The manager found the canister, 
opened it up, and saw rocks—later determined to 
be cocaine—wrapped in cellophane. The manager 
returned the canister, called police, and detained 
the accused until police arrived. The accused was 
arrested and subsequently charged with 
possession of cocaine. 
 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
the accused unsuccessfully argued his Charter 
rights were violated. In the judge’s view, the 
Charter did not apply to the manager’s search of 
the accused because it occurred between private 
individuals. The cocaine was admitted as 
evidence and the accused was convicted. 
However, he appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing he was arbitrarily detained by 
bar staff contrary to s.9 of the Charter and 
that the cocaine should have been excluded 
under s.24(2).  
 
Justice Fruman, with Justice Hunt and Cote 
concurring, first outlined the difference 
between an arrest and a detention: 
 
[T]he legal distinction in Charter cases 
between mere detention for investigative 
purposes and actual arrest is well established. 
An investigative detention is brief, based on a 
reasonable suspicion that an individual is 
connected to a particular crime…An arrest is a 
continuing act, based on reasonable and 
probable grounds a crime has been committed. 
It involves a detention and a measure of 
ongoing restraint until the arrested person is 
delivered to the police…[references omitted, 
para. 4] 
 
The Charter has limited application in that it 
applies only to government actions, not private 
individuals (such as private security officers) or 
private institutions. However, there are two 
exceptions: 
 
1. when a private individual acts as an agent of 
the state (such as the police). The relevant 
question to be asked is whether the exchange 
between the private individual and the 
accused would have taken place in the form 
and manner in which it did, had the police not 
intervened; or 
 
2. when a private individual can be categorized 
as “part of government” because they are 
performing a specific government function or 
implementing a specific governmental policy 
or program.  
 
In this case, bar staff could not be 
characterized as an agent of the state because 
the police did not intervene until after the 
accused’s detention and search. Nor was the 
detention a specific government function. Unlike 
a citizen’s arrest, which is a specific government 
function delegated to private individuals, 
investigative detentions by private persons do 
not attract Charter protection. In summary, 
Justice Fruman wrote: 
 
…the bouncer’s work may overlap with the 
government’s interest in preventing and 
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investigating crime. However, it cannot be said 
that in conducting a brief investigative 
detention, the bouncer was acting as a 
delegate of the government, carrying out its 
policies and programs. Accordingly, the 
Charter does not apply to the actions of the 
bouncer in detaining Dell, or the search and 
seizure flowing from the detention. [para. 27] 
 
Although Justice Cote concurred with Justice 
Fruman, he wished to add further comments. He 
agreed that the Charter did not apply when the 
bouncer temporarily detained the accused in the 
washroom. However, if he were wrong in holding 
that the Charter did not apply, he would have 
found that there was no s.9 breach, or if there 
was one, that it was justifiable. He stated: 
 
Such Charter rights are not absolute; they all 
have limits and exceptions. It would be 
astonishing if temporary detention was always 
a Charter breach, regardless of its duration or 
purpose. It is not: only an arbitrary or 
unreasonable detention is a breach, even where 
the Charter applies. 
 
In any event, the bouncer was not snooping 
because he was bored or curious. His employer 
had instructed him to check the washrooms 
regularly for a number of types of people and 
things, most revolving around safety. That was 
plainly not altruism: it was sound and necessary 
preservation of business and property. 
Disgruntled patrons sometimes try to burn 
down bars, and sometimes succeed 
spectacularly. Shootings and stabbings are 
more common in bars than in (say) bookstores. 
Drug dealers often try to peddle their wares 
in bars. People bring date rape drugs to bars 
and slip them into other patrons’ drinks (as 
Crown counsel reminded us here). 
 
None of that is good for business. Very few 
patrons will knowingly enter a bar dangerous to 
their health. Not many more will go to what 
looks like a lawless dive. And activity which will 
wreck the physical premises is commercially 
dangerous too. 
 
If the Charter had any application to this 
bouncer, it is unthinkable that it would remove 
the bar owner’s right to take reasonable steps 
to protect the safety of his patrons, 
employees, and premises. If the bouncer found 
someone in the washroom with a can of 
gasoline, or five clips for 
a machine gun, surely he could detain that 
person and not let him go out to get the 
accompanying blowtorch or machine gun. 
……… 
In my respectful view, the bouncer reasonably 
thought that the film container contained hard 
drugs, not film. (Most cameras are now digital, 
and photography is not common or suitable in 
bars or their washrooms). That was a danger 
to the bar’s business and patrons. The bouncer 
took 
reasonable steps to contain the danger, and 
have a responsible person (his boss) 
investigate. The delay to the appellant was 2-5 
minutes, which the appellant did not protest. 
Nor does his counsel today argue that that 
time was undue. 
 
Reasonable safety and defence of property 
and others has been made out on this 
evidence…[paras. 41-47] 
 
The evidence was admissible and the appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
FAST FACTS 
 
2004 BC Municipal Police Strengths 100+ 
Municipality Police Strength 
Vancouver 1,124 
Surrey (RCMP) 491 
Burnaby (RCMP) 241 
Victoria 211 
Richmond (RCMP) 190 
Abbotsford 175 
Delta 145 
Saanich 144 
Coquitlam (RCMP) 121 
Kelowna (RCMP) 121 
Prince George (RCMP) 121 
Langley Township (RCMP) 117 
Kamloops (RCMP) 112 
Nanaimo (RCMP) 112 
New Westminster 105 
Source: Police Services Division, Ministry of Public Safety & Solicitor 
General, British Columbia—July 2005, Municipal Case Burden Report: 
www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/police_services 
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CROWN REQUIRED TO SHOW 
TAKING OF BREATH SAMPLES 
REASONABLE 
R. v. Haas,  
[2005] Docket:C41963 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was stopped by 
police driving and admitted to 
consuming alcohol. The officer 
formed a reasonable suspicion 
the accused had alcohol in his 
body and made a demand for a breath sample 
into an approved screening device. He failed and 
the officer formed the opinion the accused was 
over 80mg% and arrested him. He was 
Chartered, read the breath demand, and agreed 
to comply, subsequently providing samples over 
the legal limit.  
 
The accused was charged with operating a 
motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 
80mg%. During a voir dire in the Ontario Court 
of Justice the Crown did not call evidence that 
the police officer making the demand under 
s.253(4) of the Criminal Code had reasonable 
and probable grounds to do so. The trial judge 
ruled that the Crown had not proved the 
necessary grounds thereby violating the 
accused’s s.8 Charter right and the breath 
samples were excluded as evidence. The charge 
was dismissed.  
 
On appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, the court ordered a new trial. In the 
appeal justice’s view, the accused bore the onus 
of proving the absence of reasonable and 
probable grounds rather than the Crown proving 
such grounds existed. Since the accused failed 
to lead evidence that the search was 
unreasonable, a s.8 violation should not have 
been found. The accused appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing that Crown was 
obliged to call evidence that reasonable and 
probable grounds existed for the breath 
demand, and without it, the readings should 
have been excluded.  
Justice Goudge, authoring the unanimous 
Ontario Court of Appeal judgment, first noted 
that the taking of breath samples is a seizure 
for the purposes of s.8 of the Charter. 
Furthermore, all warrantless seizures are prima 
facie unreasonable and once it is demonstrated 
that a seizure was warrantless, the onus then 
shifts to the Crown to show it was reasonable 
(on a balance of probabilities). In this case, the 
taking of the breath sample was warrantless. 
The same onus shifting to the Crown in 
warrantless seizures generally also shifts to the 
Crown in breath demand seizures. Thus, the 
Crown bore the burden of demonstrating that 
the officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds for the breathalyzer demand. Justice 
Goudge stated: 
 
Moreover, both statutory and policy 
considerations suggest that warrantless 
breath demands should not be [an exception to 
the general rule that warrantless searches and 
seizures are prima facie unreasonable]. To 
demonstrate compliance with s. 254(3) the 
Crown must show that the police officer 
making the breath demand had the necessary 
reasonable and probable grounds to do so. The 
evidence of this will normally be the same 
evidence that would be called to show that the 
warrantless seizure of breath was reasonable. 
If the Crown is faced with a s. 8 Charter 
challenge, it is reasonable to require the Crown 
to call as evidence to resist that challenge the 
very evidence it would call at trial, particularly 
if that evidence can be called only once in a 
proceeding blending the trial and s. 8 voir dire. 
 
Moreover, as a matter of policy, to require the 
accused in a s. 8 Charter challenge to 
demonstrate the unreasonableness of the 
seizure of breath ignores the reality that the 
Crown is in the best position to know how and 
why the seizure took place.  From this 
perspective it is sensible to require the Crown 
to prove reasonableness, rather than asking 
the accused to prove the opposite. [paras. 36-
37] 
 
Since the Crown called no evidence at the voir 
dire on the seizure of breath, the taking of the 
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sample was deemed to be unreasonable and a 
violation of the accused’s s.8 Charter rights. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed and the trial 
verdict dismissing the charges was restored.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
STOP LACKING MOTOR 
VEHICLE PURPOSE VIOLATES 
CHARTER 
R. v. Nguyen & Bui, 2005 BCPC 0202 
 
A plain clothed police officer 
conducting surveillance of a 
house suspected of being the 
site of electricity theft saw 
persons exit the house and enter a van. The 
officer then requested a uniformed officer stop 
the van and identify its occupants. The driver 
did not have her driver’s licence with her and the 
accused Nguyen, a passenger in the van, provided 
identification in his name. The van and its 
occupants were allowed to leave and the 
uniformed officer provided the occupants’ names 
to the plainclothes officer.  
 
A day or two later the uniformed officer again 
stopped another vehicle—a GMC Jimmy—seen 
leaving the house at the request of the 
plainclothes officer. The plainclothes officer had 
previously noted a rear taillight was not working 
and provided this information to the uniformed 
officer to use as a reason for the stop.  
 
The accused Bui was the driver and the accused 
Nguyen was the passenger. The accused Bui was 
issued a notice and order to repair the light and 
let go, again with the occupants’ names being 
provided to the plainclothes officer, who 
subsequently applied for a search warrant based, 
in part, on the information gleaned from the two 
traffic stops. During the execution of the 
Criminal Code search warrant respecting 
electricity theft, the police found a marihuana 
grow operation and obtained another search 
warrant under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court, the accused argued that their rights were 
violated by the traffic stops. Justice Seidemann 
III agreed and held that the two vehicle stops 
breached s.9 of the Charter. The police may 
arbitrarily stop motorists for legitimate highway 
traffic concerns, but in this case the police were 
purportedly using the highway safety aim for a 
non-authorized purpose—the general detection 
of crime. The judge stated: 
 
I find that that was what occurred in this 
case. The stop of the gold van was clearly a 
breach of the defendant's rights. There was 
no valid Motor Vehicle Act purpose for that 
stop. The officers…who testified were candid 
that the purpose of that stop was to 
ascertain the identity of the occupants, 
although [uniformed officer] was of the 
opinion that pursuant to the Motor Vehicle 
Act, she was authorized to perform that 
stop. If she had been doing that for a Motor 
Vehicle Act purpose, it would have been. It 
was not done for that purpose. 
 
The stop of the red GMC Jimmy was also a 
breach. There may have been two purposes, 
but the principal one was unrelated to Motor 
Vehicle Act enforcement, and the Motor 
Vehicle Act cannot save it. This is more akin 
to that situation…where there may have been 
two purposes, but in this case, clearly the 
principal purpose and the only reason why the 
stop actually occurred was to ascertain the 
identity of these persons, and that was 
clearly a breach of their rights pursuant to 
the Charter. [paras. 30-31, references 
omitted] 
 
Although the information concerning the traffic 
stops was excised from the search warrants, 
there was nonetheless sufficient grounds for 
their issuance. The evidence resulting from the 
search warrants was therefore admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
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LOCATION, TIME, & 
REACTION PROVIDE 
REASONABLE SUSPICION  
R. v. Chaisson, 2005 NCLA 55 
 
A police officer saw a lone 
vehicle with two occupants 
parked in the dark at the rear 
parking lot of a closed gas 
station just after midnight. Its 
lights were out and it was not running. There was 
a 24-hour donut shop and a closed restaurant 
nearby. The officer pulled up along the 
passenger side of the parked vehicle about three 
feet away. The occupants did not initially see the 
officer, but when they did they were shocked—
the driver threw something onto the floor and 
tried to stuff something under the seat.  
 
The officer asked the men what they were doing 
and asked them to get out of the car. As the 
passenger exited, the officer saw, in plain view, a 
plastic bag containing marihuana on the floor and 
a small piece of marihuana on the seat. The 
accused (driver’s seat occupant) was arrested 
and placed in the back of the police car while the 
passenger was also arrested and held outside the 
vehicle. The officer searched the vehicle and 
found two sets of scales in plain view, more 
marihuana under the driver’s seat, and just over 
a kilogram of marihuana in the trunk. After the 
search was complete—about twenty minutes 
after the arrest—the accused was advised of his 
right to counsel. The accused was taken to the 
police station and searched further. In his 
pockets additional drug items were found.  
 
At trial in the Provincial Court of Newfoundland, 
the accused was acquitted on a charge of 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking. In the trial judge’s view the 
accused’s Charter rights were violated and the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2). The Crown 
appealed to the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, 
conceding breaches of the accused’s rights 
under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, but arguing the 
trial judge’s decision to exclude the evidence 
under 24(2) was in error. Justice Welsh, 
however, in authoring the unanimous appeal court 
judgment (in an unusual turn) rejected the 
Crown’s concessions of the Charter breaches.  
 
The Detention 
 
Although the accused was detained when he was 
asked to get out of the vehicle, it was not 
arbitrary. The police are entitled to detain 
persons for investigative purposes. However, in 
assessing whether an investigative detention is 
arbitrary, a two prong analysis must be made. 
First, it must be determined whether the police 
were acting within the scope of their duties 
recognized under statute or at common law 
(which includes the preservation of peace, 
prevention of crime, and protection of public 
order). Second, it must be determined whether 
the detention was necessary for the 
performance of the recognized duty (that there 
exists reasonable grounds to detain—formerly 
known as articulable cause). In holding that the 
detention passed constitutional muster, Justice 
Welsh stated: 
 
As applied to the case before this Court…I 
conclude that the officer did not arbitrarily 
detain [the accused] within the meaning of 
section 9 of the Charter. Given the location 
of the vehicle, the time of day, and the 
reactions of [the accused] and the passenger, 
exhibiting shock and apparently trying to hide 
something, the officer had reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the occupants of the 
vehicle were involved in criminal activity, and 
that a detention for the purpose of 
questioning them was necessary. The 
detention was conducted in a reasonable 
manner and was very brief in duration. [para. 
28] 
 
The Seizures 
 
The seizure of the evidence in this case fell 
under two categories—plain view and search 
incident to arrest. Addressing the seizure of the 
marihuana in plain view, Justice Welsh wrote: 
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Reliance on the doctrine depends on three 
requirements. First, the officer must be 
lawfully in a position from which the evidence 
was plainly in view. Second, discovery of the 
evidence must be inadvertent, that is, the 
officer must not have knowledge of the 
evidence in advance. Third, it must be 
apparent to the officer at the time that the 
observed item may be evidence of a crime or 
otherwise subject to seizure. 
 
In this case, these three requirements are 
satisfied to validate the seizure of the items 
that were in plain view when the occupants 
got out of the vehicle. The officer was 
lawfully in a position to see inside the 
vehicle…. Discovery of the evidence was 
inadvertent in the sense that the officer had 
no preconceived view regarding what he would 
find when he approached the vehicle. Finally, 
when the occupants got out of the vehicle and 
the officer saw the ziplock bag containing 
what appeared to him to be marihuana, 
together with a small piece of what he 
believed to be marihuana on the passenger 
seat, in plain view, he was aware that these 
items may be evidence of a drug related 
offence. [paras. 33-34] 
 
Following the seizure of the bag containing 
marihuana, the officer arrested the accused. 
The power to search incident to an arrest may 
include an automobile provided the police are 
attempting to achieve some valid purpose 
connected to the arrest, such as protecting or 
discovering evidence. Here, “the search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner and for the 
purpose of discovering and preserving evidence 
incidental to arrest,” said Justice Welsh. 
Similarly, the search back at the police station 
was also conducted in a reasonable manner and 
for a valid purpose incidental to the arrest.   
 
Right to Counsel 
 
Under s.10(b) of the Charter an arrestee is 
entitled to be advised of his right to counsel 
without delay (which effectively means 
immediately) . In this case, the officer did not 
advise the accused of his rights until some 20 
minutes after arrest, which amounted to a 
breach.  However, contrary to the trial judge’s 
decision, Justice Welsh ruled the evidence 
admissible under s.24(2).  
 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, a conviction was 
entered, and the matter was remitted back to 
the trial judge for sentencing. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that the average age of a police recruit is 28 
years old. The following two tables outline 
recruit profiles from two recent recruit studies: 
 
British Columbia 
Municipal Police Recruit Profile 
Age  
Average 28 yrs. 
Range 21-42 yrs. 
Gender  
Male 72% 
Female 28% 
Education  
High School only 2% 
Some College/University 16% 
College Diploma 30% 
Undergraduate Degree 48% 
Graduate Degree 3% 
Previous Police Experience  
No 76% 
Yes: Regular Member 3% 
No:   Reserve/Auxiliary Member 21% 
Source: Novakowski, Mike (2003) Exploring Field Training Within 
British Columbia’s Independent Police Agencies: It’s the Singer, 
Not the Song 
Data based upon 242 recruits from 2000-2002 
 
Ontario Police College Recruit Profile 
Age  
Average 28 yrs.  
Range 20-50 yrs. 
Gender  
Male 81% 
Female 19% 
Education  
No College/University 5% 
Some College/University 13% 
College Program 49% 
BA/BSc 33% 
Source: Morris, Ramona (2004) Canadian Review of Policing 
Research 
Data based upon 7,900 recruits from 1998 to 2003. 
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POLICE ALLOWED TO ENTER 
ONTO PROPERTY TO 
INVESTIGATE B&E 
R. v. Nguyen, 2005 BCSC 963 
 
At 3 am an off-duty police 
officer, looking out her third 
story window, saw two men on 
the sidewalk directly across the 
street from her apartment. They were walking 
alongside the front yard fence of a house and 
peering into the yard. They entered onto the 
property and began skulking around. One male 
had a flashlight and peered into a window by the 
font door while the second male appeared to 
bend over and pry the window. The officer called 
911 and reported a possible grow rip because she 
had earlier suspected the house contained a 
marihuana grow operation. As a marked police 
car arrived, the off duty officer saw one of the 
men run across the yard, jump a fence and run 
towards the back alley. A police dog track was 
unsuccessful, but police found a suspicious 
vehicle driving nearby containing two passengers 
who matched the general description of the men 
seen in the yard. These passengers, along with 
the driver gave suspicious stories. 
 
Police went into the yard and saw several 
windows with pry marks, including one with a 
screen removed and an open window large enough 
for a person to enter. A strong odour of 
marihuana could be detected, fans could be 
heard running, and a Mylar film could be seen. 
The police felt it necessary to enter the 
residence and determine whether any more 
suspects were inside or whether any residents 
were harmed.  Police knocked on the door and 
the accused answered. He was arrested and 
police entered to sweep the residence for other 
persons. No one else was found but a marihuana 
grow operation was discovered. A search warrant 
was subsequently obtained and evidence was 
seized.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme 
Court on charges of production of marihuana and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking, the 
accused argued that the initial police entry into 
the yard lacked legal justification and therefore 
violated his rights under s.8 of the Charter 
protecting him against unreasonable search and 
seizure. Justice Joyce, however, rejected this 
submission. He stated: 
 
I have come to the conclusion that the police 
had lawful authority to go into the yard and 
look at the windows, in order to investigate 
whether a break and enter had taken place. I 
am of the opinion that in the circumstances 
the police had an implied licence to be on the 
property and that in investigating the state 
of the windows they did not exceed the scope 
of the licence. [para. 26] 
 
And further: 
 
I am satisfied that in this case the police did 
not enter onto the property with the 
intention of gathering evidence against the 
occupant. While [the off duty officer] 
strongly suspected that the house was the 
site of a marihuana grow operation when she 
and her fellow officers entered onto the 
property, I accept her evidence and find as a 
fact that when she went into the yard and 
went up to the house she was continuing an 
investigation into a possible break and enter 
under the Criminal Code, not an investigation 
of a suspected marihuana grow operation 
under the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act…I am satisfied the entry into the yard 
was not a ruse, the real purpose of which was 
to gain evidence in support of a search 
warrant. When they looked at the windows 
the police were looking for evidence to 
confirm a break and enter or attempted 
break and enter. 
 
In my view, when the police had seen 
suspicious men lurking around the house and 
apparently trying to force their way in 
through a window, they were entitled within 
the scope of the implied licence to take a look 
at the windows for signs of forced entry, 
before knocking on the door to communicate 
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with the occupants and advise them why they 
were and what they had seen. 
 
It is my opinion that the owner of a home may 
be taken to authorize the police, who see 
persons attempting to break in, to come into 
their yard and check the front windows or 
door to see whether the home has been 
breached, without first having to knock on 
the door and ask permission. In my view the 
occupant can be said to have waived his 
privacy rights to that extent, unless he has a 
locked gate or has posted signs barring entry 
onto the property. 
 
Counsel for [the accused] submits that if the 
police had not suspected a marihuana grow 
operation they would have been justified in 
going into the yard and looking at the windows 
for evidence of a break and enter. He 
concedes that absent such suspicion the 
police could act upon an implied licence. 
However, counsel submits that because of 
their suspicion the police knew they would 
likely be unwelcome visitors and that in these 
circumstances there can be no implied licence 
of waiver of privacy rights. 
 
I do not accept that submission. The police 
had only a suspicion. They had no strong 
evidence when they went into the yard that 
there was a marihuana grow operation in the 
residence. Furthermore, [the accused] had 
taken no steps to limit or nullify the implied 
licence. [references omitted, paras. 31-42] 
 
The evidence was admissible and the accused 
was convicted. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
BY THE NUMBERS: HOMICIDE 
 
Homicide by the Numbers BC’s 2004 Top 5 
City/Town Number 
Vancouver 26 
Surrey (RCMP) 11 
Victoria 7 
Prince George (RCMP) 6 
Abbotsford 5 
Richmond (RCMP) 5 
Source: BC Coroners Service, BC Homicide Statistics-1997 to 2004, 
August 24, 2005 
EXTENDED VEHICLE SEARCH 
INCIDENTAL TO DETENTION 
UNLAWFUL 
R. v. Batzer, 
(2005) Docket: C41793 (OntCA) 
 
Two police officers responded to 
a 911 call from a homeowner that 
two men dressed in dark clothing 
were outside his residence 
armed with a gun. The caller was 
frantic and police received further information 
that the men were now believed to be on the 
roof. The house was one of three located in an 
isolated area where shots had been fired in a 
random, unsolved drive-by shooting at one of the 
other houses two weeks earlier. The officers 
parked their car nearby and walked to the house 
where they spoke to the homeowner. The 
homeowner thought the suspects may have went 
into a field, but there were no tracks in the snow 
around the house.  
 
While on scene, the officers approached a 
vehicle parked a short distance away from their 
cruiser. They did not hear the vehicle arrive and 
were concerned that the gunmen may have 
returned. The two occupants matched the 
general description of the suspects—both males 
wearing dark clothing—and were detained for 
investigation. They were ordered out of the car 
onto the ground, handcuffed, and asked what 
they were doing. The accused (driver) explained 
he had been invited to come over by a resident 
of the house but got stuck in the snow as they 
arrived. The men were patted down for weapons 
and the car was searched once but nothing was 
found. Then, on a second search, the glove 
compartment was checked and a zippered, nylon 
case with “Remington” (a gun manufacturer) 
written on it was found inside. It was opened and 
police found it contained 22 grams of cocaine 
and 13 ecstasy pills. The accused was arrested 
and charged with possession of drugs for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
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At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused was acquitted of the drug charge. 
Although the initial detention for investigation 
and incidental pat down for safety was lawful, 
the extended vehicle search was unreasonable 
and violated s.8 of the Charter. She found the 
circumstances were not so exigent that the 
police could have determined whether the 
accused’s innocent explanation for his presence 
was true. Had they checked out the accused’s 
story there may have been no need to search the 
car at all. The evidence was subsequently 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. The 
Crown then appealed to Ontario’s top court.  
 
Justice Goudge, authoring the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s judgment, suggested that “on the right 
facts, a search incidental to a lawful stop could 
comply with the common law and pass 
constitutional muster even though it went 
beyond a pat down.” However, in this case the 
trial judge’s conclusion that it was unreasonable 
for police to extend the search as they did was 
well founded. As Justice Goudge noted: 
 
Ultimately, [the trial judge] found that the 
[accused’s] story could have been checked out 
by the officers and that the situation faced 
by them was not sufficiently exigent or 
critical to warrant extending the search to 
the contents of the closed box in the glove 
compartment of the car. It was not 
reasonably necessary for the search to go 
that far. She concluded that in all the 
circumstances the extended search was 
unreasonable. 
 
Her finding that the circumstances were not 
sufficiently critical is supported by the fact 
that the occupants of the car were said to 
match a description that was only very 
general and unspecific, the absence of 
weapons on their person, the innocent 
explanation offered for their presence, and 
the apparent absence of footprints fleeing 
the area of the house. 
 
The same is true of the finding that their 
innocent explanation could readily have been 
checked so as to make the extended search 
unnecessary. The two occupants were 
handcuffed and on the ground. The officers 
were a very short distance from the house, 
and had just spoken to the owner. They were 
aware that there was a second male in the 
house. The [accused’s] story could easily have 
been checked, with no meaningful if any 
extension of the appellant’s detention beyond 
that required for the extended search. If 
confirmed, the extended search would have 
been unnecessary. [paras. 18-20] 
 
As for whether the evidence was nonetheless 
admissible, again the trial judge made no error: 
 
[T]he extended search could reasonably be 
viewed as a relatively serious breach of the 
[accused’s] Charter rights. It went beyond 
what was required to mitigate concerns about 
officer safety. The officers had no 
reasonable and probable grounds. There is a 
considerable expectation of privacy in a small 
case that is zippered shut in the glove 
compartment of one’s car. And where one of 
the officers makes clear that she would have 
searched this car and any car coming down 
the road that night regardless of whether 
she has the common law power to do so, it is 
hard for the police to rely on good faith in 
light of this ignoring of the scope of the 
officers’ authority. Finally, in all the 
circumstances, including the readily available 
alternative of checking out the [accused’s] 
explanation for being there, I cannot fault 
the conclusion that the administration of 
justice would be brought into disrepute if the 
evidence obtained by the extended search 
was admitted. [para. 24] 
 
The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal 
upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
 
Coming 
soon!!!
www.policeleadership.org 
(see p. 20) 
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EXPERIENCED POLICE OFFICER 
BEST TO ASSESS 
CIRCUMSTANCES  
R. v. Furness, 2005 BCPC 0389 
 
Two plain clothed police officers 
driving an unmarked police car 
were travelling in a high drug 
trafficking and drug use area. 
They saw the accused and a known female “drug 
middler” in an alcove area. The two left and 
began to walk up the street towards a park, a 
known location for drug use. The accused was 
walking purposely and appeared to have a crack 
pipe in the palm of his hand. Believing they were 
going to smoke crack, the two were arrested by 
police on a stairway to the park. The accused had 
a crack pipe in his hand and police found a rock 
of cocaine in his pants pocket. He was charged 
with possession of a controlled substance. 
 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, 
the accused argued there were insufficient 
grounds upon which to make the arrest under 
s.495 of the Criminal Code. Justice Cowling, 
however, ruled the arrest lawful. In determining 
whether an officer has reasonable grounds, a 
two prong analysis is used. First, the officer 
must honestly have a subjective belief that a 
person committed the offence. Second, a 
reasonable person standing in the place of the 
arresting officer would also believe that 
reasonable grounds existed to make the arrest.   
 
In this case, Judge Cowling found the officer 
possessed the requisite subjective belief. As for 
the objective test he wrote: 
 
There are, in this world, matters of opinion 
where reasonable people may reasonably hold 
different views.  Probably the best person to 
assess the dynamics of [the accused’s] 
situation on the Cavan Street sidewalk would 
be an experienced police officer or an 
experienced addict, and for the rest of us it 
is a question of being an armchair-
quarterback. [para. 9] 
 
And further: 
 
I find it, nevertheless, difficult to evaluate 
on an "objective" basis an incident, the proper 
value of which is more the subject of art than 
science.  I accept the evidence of the 
officers as credible and trustworthy in this 
matter and that their assessment of the 
situation was honestly made.  In their place, I 
personally would have been less confident to 
presume what [the accused] was about, but 
that is not the same as saying that I consider 
their decision to be erroneous or 
unreasonable. 
 
I am prepared to accept that the arrest was 
valid, although the approach I would take to 
the matter is that in all of the circumstances, 
the observation of [the accused] with the 
additional element of the apparent crack pipe 
sticking out from his hand, would have 
justified the investigative detention of him. 
In this case, that detention would have 
lawfully led to the confirmation that the item 
was a crack pipe and the necessary basis for 
a search which would have disclosed the rock 
of crack cocaine would, in my view, then exist. 
[paras. 15-16] 
 
Since the arrest was lawful a search incidental 
to the arrest was permissible. Furthermore, even 
if the judge was in error in holding the arrest 
lawful he would have nonetheless admitted the 
evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
BY THE NUMBERS:  
TEEN SUICIDE DEATHS 
 
Teen Suicide Deaths—BC’s 2004 Top 4 
City/Town Number 
Surrey (RCMP) 3 
Vancouver 3 
Abbotsford 2 
Campbell River (RCMP) 2 
Source: BC Coroners Service, Teen Deaths-1997 to 2004, August 
26, 2005 
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FEENEY WARRANT NOT 
REQUIRED TO ENTER 
APARTMENT HALLWAY 
R. v. Beune, 2005 BCPC 175 
 
The accused called 911 from his 
apartment to make a noise 
complaint about his neighbour. 
Police responded and became 
aware that the complainant was 
wanted on an outstanding warrant for uttering 
threats. Two officers attended, entered the 
building without being buzzed in by the accused, 
and knocked on the accused’s door. He was asked 
to open the door and step into the hall. The 
police learned the noise had stopped and the 
warrant then became the focus of the police 
contact. The accused was told he was under 
arrest for the warrant and the officer put his 
hand on the accused’s shoulder. The accused 
bolted towards the suite and began yelling and 
flailing, but he was handcuffed and taken to jail.  
As a result of his resistance to being arrested, 
the accused was charged with obstructing a 
police officer. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued, among other grounds, that the 
hallways of his apartment building were part of 
his dwelling and the police required a “Feeney” 
warrant (ss.529/529.1 Criminal Code) to enter a 
dwelling house for the purpose of arresting a 
person therein, absent exigent circumstances. 
His submission hinged on an interpretation that 
the hallway was within the “curtilage” of the 
dwelling house under the s.2 Criminal Code 
definition of dwelling house. In holding that the 
area of the hallway was not part of the dwelling, 
Judge Dhillon wrote: 
 
In summary, the law has carved out a 
distinction in the treatment afforded to 
those occupying a residence in multi-unit 
buildings by holding that the common areas 
(such as the lobby, hallways or corridors) are 
for the use and enjoyment of all occupants 
and their respective invitees. Persons, 
including police, are impliedly invited or 
permitted to be in the common areas of such 
buildings and are not trespassers at law if 
they approach the unit door for the purpose 
of communicating with an occupant. 
 
Moreover, these common areas are for access 
to and egress from an occupant’s home or 
dwelling. There is no compelling privacy 
interest in these areas because they are not 
used for private personal activities normally 
conducted within one’s residence such as 
eating, grooming, socializing or sleeping. 
 
In the case at bar, a locked door and buzzer 
is not sufficient to absolutely bar public 
entry into the common areas of the building 
at 590 Alexander Street. All residents are 
deemed to impliedly consent to visitors and 
invitees. Absent an express revocation of 
that consent, no case for trespass could be 
made out against the police or any other 
person on the common property. I conclude 
that police are permitted to approach the 
door of any resident of an apartment without 
the necessity of a Feeney warrant. 
 
I do not discount the position urged by 
counsel for the accused that no court appears 
to have considered whether, in modern 
society, the relationship between an 
apartment building and a residential unit 
within it falls within the area of the dwelling 
curtilage. There may be a plausible argument 
to be made that the unit in which [the 
accused] resided at the time, being connected 
directly by a hallway or passageway to the 
front door of the outer building envelope, may 
fit within the statutory definition of 
dwelling-house under section 2 of the Code. 
 
I prefer to answer the broader question of 
whether, absent prior judicial authorization, 
police lack legal authority to enter upon the 
common areas of apartment buildings for 
purposes of enforcing process at the suite of 
an occupant. I find the line of authority 
referred to above to be compelling and 
persuasive that police do not trespass when 
they enter into the common hallways of 
apartment buildings and prior legal 
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authorization in such a case is not required… 
[references omitted, paras. 47-51] 
 
Despite the ruling on the hallway issue, the 
accused was acquitted of the obstruction 
charge. In the trial judge’s view, there was a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had 
the necessary intent to sustain a conviction. He 
stated: 
 
I find that the evidence of [the accused] 
raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [The 
accused] is clearly an intelligent person who 
testified in a forthright manner. He said that 
when he was told about the arrest warrant, he 
asked to see a copy in the absence of which he 
turned immediately to go into his unit to get a 
phone to call his lawyer. I accept his evidence 
of his motive to return to his suite. He was in 
his doorway when the police prevented him 
from moving any further. At that time, he was 
not explicitly warned that he was resisting 
arrest and his actions were obstructing the 
police. The police agreed that they were not 
going to let him go back into his unit because 
they felt they had no lawful authority to 
follow him inside without a Feeney warrant. 
They restrained him as he tried to get to the 
phone to call his lawyer. His resistance to the 
restraint is the basis for the charge. 
 
In considering whether [the accused] had the 
necessary criminal intent to obstruct the 
police in carrying out his arrest, I accept [the 
accused’s] evidence of his intent to call a 
lawyer. This evidence, coupled with the lack of 
a warning by police that his conduct amounted 
to obstruction, leaves me in reasonable doubt 
on the issue of his intent to obstruct. Had the 
police themselves not been constrained by 
their inability to enter his suite, I doubt that 
the matter would have unfolded in the manner 
in which it did. [paras. 62-63] 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
On Assaulting Police—Sir Robert Peel, who is 
considered to be the animator of the modern 
police force, indicated that "The police are the 
community, and the community is the police." 
That is the relationship that should exist 
between modern police services and their 
community. In many ways police act as society's 
surrogates. They do the tasks that society finds 
unpleasant, and while members of society 
generally may be able to turn a blind eye to the 
more unpleasant aspects of our societal 
interaction, police must not turn a blind eye, 
they must go out and do those unpleasant tasks. 
It's the nature of doing their duty which makes 
them vulnerable. The assault on Constable De 
Guzman and on Constable MacNeil represents an 
assault on society at large—Ontario Court of 
Justice J. Taylor3  
 
INSUFFICIENT NEXUS 
BETWEEN PERSON & CRIME: 
DETENTION UNLAWFUL 
R. v. Konopski, Lee & McLaughlin, 
2005 BCPC 0298 
 
Police executed a search warrant 
at a residence and found a grow 
operation in the basement. While 
the police were still at the 
residence, the accused Lee 
arrived with a female and knocked on the door. 
An officer answered and Lee identified himself. 
The officer knew Lee was associated to the 
residence as an owner or landlord and believed 
he may be associated to the grow operation. The 
officer was also concerned for his safety with 
the two people attending the door of an active 
crime scene. He detained Lee and the female, 
handcuffed them both and directed them into 
the residence. Lee and the bag he was carrying 
were searched. Police found $6,000 cash in Lee’s 
jacket pocket and items that could be used to 
weigh and package marihuana in his bag. Lee was 
then arrested. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court on 
charges of marihuana production, possession for 
                                                 
3 R. v. Swift [2005] O.J. No. 3203 
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the purpose of trafficking and electricity theft, 
Lee argued, among other grounds, that he was 
arbitrarily detained contrary to s.9 of the 
Charter and the searches of both his person and 
his bag violated s.8 of the Charter. The Crown 
contended, on the other hand, that the 
detention was not arbitrary and the searches 
were the lawful product of an investigative 
detention.  
 
Judge Bastin agreed with the accused. He said: 
 
In my opinion, it was reasonable for [the 
officer] to secure Mr. Lee and his female 
companion because they posed a potential 
danger to him and to the other officers in 
the course of their investigation of an active 
crime scene. It does not follow, however, that 
there was necessarily a clear nexus between 
Mr. Lee and the crime or crimes being 
investigated. Clearly there was no evidence at 
all to suggest the female was associated to 
the crimes occurring in the residence. 
 
The difficult issue for the court to decide in 
this case is whether [the officer] had proper 
grounds to detain Mr. Lee for investigative 
detention. I conclude from the evidence on 
the voir dire on the balance of probabilities 
that [the officer] did not have the required 
grounds to detain Mr. Lee for investigative 
purposes. Mr. Lee's presence at the front 
door, and the fact that he knocked at the 
door, and [the officer’s] belief that he was 
the landlord for the residence did not amount 
to the "clear nexus" between Mr. Lee and the 
marihuana grow operation that was required 
to meet the legal test for investigative 
detention that is established by the Mann 
decision. 
 
I therefore find that Mr. Lee and his female 
companion were both arbitrarily detained by 
[the officer]. Clearly, then, the s. 9 Charter 
right of Mr. Lee was infringed or denied. 
 
The Mann case dealt with police powers of 
search when a person is lawfully detained for 
investigative purposes. There are no such 
powers when a person is not lawfully detained 
for investigative purposes. I find, therefore, 
that the search of Mr. Lee's person and the 
search of his bag resulted in his s. 8 Charter 
rights being infringed or denied. 
 
My finding that Mr. Lee was arbitrarily 
detained, to use a colloquial phrase, is a "close 
call". I can appreciate that another court 
could reach an opposite conclusion; therefore, 
if I am in error in finding that Mr. Lee was 
arbitrarily detained, I would rule in the 
alternative that the search of Mr. Lee's 
person was still unreasonable as going beyond 
a pat- down search. The search of Mr. Lee's 
bag would be also unreasonable as going 
beyond the limits of police powers of search 
of a person detained for investigative 
purposes as that was determined by the Mann 
decision. [paras. 52-56] 
 
As a result the evidence was excluded under 
s.24(2).  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
BY THE NUMBERS:  
ILLICIT DRUG DEATHS 
 
Illicit Drug Deaths—BC’s 2004 Top 11 
City/Town Number 
Vancouver  64 
Surrey (RCMP) 18 
Victoria 15 
Nanaimo (RCMP) 7 
Kamloops (RCMP) 6 
Coquitlam (RCMP) 5 
Abbotsford 4 
Prince George (RCMP) 4 
Burnaby (RCMP) 3 
Kelowna (RCMP) 3 
Maple Ridge (RCMP) 3 
Source: BC Coroners Service, Illicit Drug Deaths-1997 to 2004, 
August 23, 2005 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
If we think we’re in a grey area, we may be, but 
grey is just white tainted with black—Grant 
Warkentin 
 20            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 5 
  September/October 2005 
2006 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 10-12, 2006 
 
Mark your calendar! The British 
Columbia Association of Chief's 
of Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General 
and the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia will be hosting 
the "Police Leadership 2006 Conference" April 
10 to 12, 2006 at the Westin Bayshore in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. This is Canada’s 
largest Police Leadership Conference and was 
sold out in 2004 with more than 600 delegates 
attending.  
 
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or 
rank and this conference will provide delegates 
from the police community with an opportunity to 
engage in a variety of leadership areas. Police 
Leadership 2006 will bring together experts who 
will provide current, lively, and interesting topics 
on leadership. This carefully chosen list of 
speakers will provide a first class opportunity at 
a first class venue to hear some of the world’s 
outstanding authorities on leadership. 
Therefore, early registration is encouraged so 
you do not miss out on this great opportunity. 
 
Beautiful downtown Vancouver will provide the 
backdrop for the Police Leadership 2006 
Conference. The host hotel, the Westin 
Bayshore Resort and Marina, offers state of the 
art facilities, excellent accommodation rates, 
and promises to be an enjoyable venue for the 
conference. The Westin is located on the shores 
of Coal Harbour, overlooking Stanley Park, and is 
a short walk to the downtown’s business district, 
shopping, and entertainment. Or you may choose 
to jog, bike, or roller blade along Vancouver’s 
famous Seawall.  
To date, Police Leadership 2006 has confirmed 
the following presenters: 
 
Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire 
O.C., C.M.M., M.S.C., C.D. (Retired) 
 
Stephen Covey  
Author, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People 
 
Richard Boyatzis 
Author, Primal Leadership 
 
Rick Dinse  
Chief of Police, Salt Lake City Police Department  
 
John King  
Assistant Chief of Police, Montgomery County 
Department of Police 
 
Eddie Compass 
Former Chief of Police, New Orleans Police 
Department  
 
Conference Cost 
 
The registration fee for the Police Leadership 
2006 Conference is $385 CDN (plus GST) if you 
register before March 5, 2006. The conference 
fee for registrations received AFTER March 5, 
2006 will be $425 CDN (plus GST). The 
registration cut off date is April 5, 2006.  
 
The conference fee includes a reception on 
Monday evening, lunches on Tuesday and 
Wednesday, and a banquet dinner on Tuesday. 
Each participant will receive a "welcome package" 
upon registration. Register early, as the number 
of delegates is limited and past conferences 
have sold out prior to the registration cut-off 
date.  
 
Conference attire is business casual. 
 
For more information visit 
www.policeleadership.org
 
